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ON THe CONCeALMeNT OF ANTe PAveLIĆ 
IN AUSTRIA IN 1945-1946
Ante DELIĆ*
Based on available American and British documents and thus-far 
unconsulted papers left behind by Ante Pavelić, the leader of the 
Independent State of Croatia, the author analyzes Pavelić’s concealment 
in Austria and the role of Western agencies therein. Some of the relevant 
literature indicates that the Catholic Church and Western agencies took 
part in Pavelić’s concealment. The author concludes that all such conjecture 
lacks any foundation in the available sources.
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Historiography is generally familiar with the fate of the army of the Inde-
pendent State of Croatia and the civilian population which, at the end of the 
war in early May 1945, withdrew toward Austria in fear of advancing commu-
nist forces, with the aim of surrendering to the Allies. These people were ex-
tradited to the Yugoslav army with the explanation that they would be treated 
in compliance with the international laws of war. As it transpired, this “treat-
ment” was one of the most tragic episodes in the history of the Croatian nation, 
known under the terms Bleiburg and the Way of the Cross.1 A portion of these 
refugees who managed to elude this fate ended up in Allied refugee camps, 
mostly in Italy, Austria and Germany.2 However, even in these camps, besides 
* Ante Delić, MA, University of Zadar, Zadar, Republic of Croatia
1 Cf. Martina GRAHEK RAVANČIĆ, Bleiburg i Križni put u historiografiji, publicistici i me-
moarskoj literaturi, Master’s thesis, Department of History, University of Zagreb, 2006, pp. 3-9 
and the sources and literature cited therein.
2 For more, see Berislav JANDRIĆ, “Saveznički izbjeglički logori. Počeci otpora hrvatske 
političke emigracije komunističkom režimu u domovini (logor Fermo)”, 1945. - Razdjelnica hr-
vatske povijesti, Zbornik radova sa znanstvenog skupa održanog u Hrvatskom institutu za povijest 
u Zagrebu 5. i 6. svibnja 2005., Zagreb 2006, 305-322. and Ibid., “Prijepori saveznika oko zahtje-
va Jugoslavije za izručenjem osumnjičenih za ratne zločine iz savezničkih izbjegličkih logora u 
Italiji 1945. - 1947.”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 38/2, Zagreb 2006, 457-498.
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all of the other troubles, it was necessary to evade Yugoslavia’s manhunts to 
ensure the extradition of “war criminals”,3 and the most fortunate made their 
way to transoceanic countries or remained in Western Europe.
However, with reference to the movements and concealment of Ante Pavelić, 
the former leader (‘poglavnik’) of the Independent State of Croatia (hereinafter 
referred to by its better-known Croatian acronym NDH), from his flight from 
Croatia until his arrival in Argentina, the relevant historiography still contains 
many lacunae. The question of the role played by Western intelligence agencies 
in Pavelić’s concealment after he fled Croatia has also become topical.4 Often 
such assertions are even politically motivated, e.g. in order to compromise the 
Catholic Church. Naturally, all of this must be placed within the context of de-
teriorating post-war relations between Yugoslavia and the West.5
The intention of this text is to contribute to the illumination of certain 
controversies surrounding the concealment of Ante Pavelić in Austria, based 
on available American and British documents and the papers of Ante Pavelić 
himself held by his daughter Višnja in Madrid which have thus far not un-
dergone scholarly scrutiny. By analyzing these sources, I shall endeavour to 
reconstruct Pavelić’s movements and sojourn in Austria, and the relevance of 
the information on Pavelić’s movements which the West had at its disposal.
*   *   *
According to historian Jere Jareb, “Dr. Ante Pavelić left Zagreb on Sunday 
afternoon, 6 May 1945 and then spent the night of 6-7 May at the Novi Dvori 
estate”.6 His immediate entourage included his son, Lt. Velimir Pavelić, Ivan 
3 Already at the Moscow Conference, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin concluded that in case 
all of those who “join the ranks of the guilty (...) the Allied powers will pursue them to the ut-
termost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be 
done.” (“Ratni zločinci u službi imperijalista”, Trideset dana, Zagreb, January 1948, 67). The same 
conclusions were reiterated at Yalta and Potsdam.
4 “It can be stated with certainty that the Americans attempted to exploit the Ustasha emi-
grants to obtain useful military data, while the Ustasha leadership attempted to exploit common 
anti-communism and fear of the expansion of the USSR’s zone of influence to renew the NDH 
and destroy Yugoslavia” (Zdenko RADELIĆ, Križari-gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945.-1950., Zagreb: 
Dom i svijet, 2002, 51).
5 Despite a series of incidents (knocking down two American aircraft and sinking a British 
destroyer in 1946, the Trieste crisis, etc.), British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin believed that 
relations with Yugoslavia had to be set on “firm foundations”. When speaking of Yugoslav war 
crimes, both sides had sound reasons for their actions: “All involved parties nurtured misunder-
standings and all were responsible for the failure to administer justice”. (LANE J. Ann, “Putting 
Britain Right with Tito: The Displaced Persons Question in Anglo-Yugoslav Relations 1946-7”, 
European History Quarterly, vol. 22., London, Newbury Park and New Delhi 1992. 219-220, and 
more in Katarina SPEHNJAK, Britanski pogled na Hrvatsku 1945.-1948., Zagreb, 2006, 146-152).
6  Jere JAREB, “Sudbina posljednje hrvatske državne vlade i hrvatskih ministara iz Drugog 
svjetskog rata (Prilog za studiju o hrvatskoj državnoj vladi)”, Hrvatska revija, Munich-Barce-
lona, June 1978, year XXVIII, vol. 2 (110), p. 222. Vice Admiral Nikola Steinfel, who retreated 
Review of Croatian History 7/2011, no.1, 293 - 313
295
Ico Kirin, the commander of the Security Service of the Poglavnik’s Bodyguard 
Corpus (Croatian acronym: PTS) and Erih Lisak, the former director general 
of the General Directorate of Public Safety and Order. Together with the new-
ly-arrived high-ranking officers, the members of the ‘Supreme Command’, and 
a PTS unit, Pavelić left Novi Dvori on Monday evening, 7 May, and set off for 
Austria. By nightfall he was in Rogaška Slatina, in Slovenia, whence he arrived 
at 9 p.m. On the next day, “the final meeting of the Poglavnik’s Supreme Com-
mand was held in Rogaška Slatina”.7
According to Lisak’s statement made during a post-war investigation, the 
session was “held in light of news from a German general that the German 
armed forces, against all expectations, would capitulate on the Eastern front 
as well, i.e., to the Russians, and for us this meant that the German forces still 
in Slovenia would surrender to the Partisans with their arms. Since our forces 
withdrawing into Slovenia were counting on the German army and its arms, 
our units were put in a very difficult position (...) The poglavnik was visibly 
concerned – Lisak stated – over the fate of the people, both soldiers and civil-
ians, who had voluntarily departed from the country with the army. He em-
phasized this at several points.”8
In a post-war investigation, the Third Reich’s Ambassador Siegfried Kas-
che testified that General Juppe established contact with General Löhr, com-
mander of the South-east and German army Group E withdrawing from the 
Balkans, in Rogaška Slatina on 8 May,9 and learned of the German capitulation. 
When asked about the fate of the NDH armed forces under Löhr’s command, 
Pavelić told Kasche “that he had no contact with his units, but that he agreed 
that his units surrender like the Germans, while he would decide on his own 
fate for himself ”.10 The meeting in Rogaška Slatina was “cut short by dramatic 
outbursts by certain Croatian officers”, and it was decided that the NDH would 
unconditionally surrender to the Allies, while its armed forces “were supposed 
to withdraw to the north-west toward Ljubljana, in order to avoid being cap-
with the ‘Supreme Command’, later testified in an investigation: “It was assumed that Germany 
would continue to hold out and that it intended to mount resistance in an eastward direction, 
while letting events in the west develop on their own. There was the conviction that with the 
help of the Anglo-American Western Allies some sort of agreement would be reached with the 
Soviet Union in the sense of resolving foreign policy issues. This view was generally upheld by 
the Germans. It was believed that there would be a conflict among the Allies, and the entire plan 
was based on this” (B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, Zagreb: Globus, 1986, 133-134).
7 Jere JAREB, “Sudbina posljednje hrvatske državne vlade...”, 222.
8 B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 13.
9 In the thus-far unpublished fourth volume of his memoirs (Doživljaji), written after the war, 
Pavelić wrote of Löhr: “However, this general, instead of a friend, proved to be our enemy, par-
ticularly an enemy of the regime and the Ustasha movement” (Pavelić papers (hereinafter: OP), 
Madrid, “Doživljaji IV.”, chapter “Urota proti NDH-Sastanak s Hitlerom-Put na iztočno bojište”, 
manuscript, 2.)
10 B. KRIZMAN, Ustaše i Treći Reich, vol. 2, Zagreb: Globus, 1983, 338.
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tured by Russian or Tito’s forces, and they were supposed to surrender to Brit-
ish or American troops”.11 After General Löhr transferred command of the 
NDH armed forces to Pavelić, on the next day he appointed General Vjekoslav 
Luburić the commander of withdrawing Croatian forces.12
During the investigation, Perčević stated that after Löhr announced the 
capitulation, Pavelić was “enraged, and wanted to speak to Löhr personally 
and ask him about something that had been arranged with the Germans, that 
together with the Croatian army they defend the Samobor-Ludbreg line while 
the Anglo-Americans come in from the rear, and then they could surrender 
together. Later I learned from another officer that Löhr had refused to speak to 
the Poglavnik personally and sent him a message to have Croatian units with-
draw to the northern bank of the Drava River, in Austrian territory, if he does 
not wish to surrender to the People’s Liberation Army”.13
After the conclusion of the meeting in Rogaška Slatina, on “8 May the Po-
glavnik’s procession set off through Maribor, with the objective of reaching 
Wolfsberg and Klagenfurt in Carinthia”.14 With occasion brief exchanges of 
gunfire with the Partisans, they continued toward the Austrian border. After 
crossing into Austria, Pavelić changed into civilian attire and then entered an-
other automobile and separated from the remainder of his accompaniment.15 
Lisak testified that Pavelić’s group moved onward toward Judenburg, although 
“when we arrived there, we heard that there was no longer an Anglo-American 
commission there, and that it had moved to Salzburg”.16 On the way to Salz-
burg, in front of Trieben, they learned that there were Soviet units there, and 
that the latter were also moving in from the direction of Judenburg.17 they 
abandoned their automobiles, split into two groups, donned rucksacks and 
11 Ibid., 340.
12 J. JAREB, Pola stoljeća hrvatske politike, reprint, Zagreb: Institut za suvremenu povijest, 1995, 
116, note 156.
13 B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 32. Pavelić’s son Velimir wrote that his father “in Rogaška 
Slatina after the meeting of the main staff (...) literally said: ‘Just imagine what Löhr told me: 
I’m surrendering to the Partisans, and you do what you want’”. (OP, file-folder containing notes 
written by Velimir Pavelić).
14 Jere JAREB, “Sudbina posljednje hrvatske državne vlade...”, 222.
15 According to Lisak, this occurred in Spielfeld, while according to Kren it was in Leibnitz (B. 
KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 13-14). These differing versions were probably due to the fact 
that these two towns are only roughly 10 km from each other.
16 Ibid., 14.
17 In an entry dated 10 May, Bracanović wrote: “We arrived in Judenburg at 5 a.m. and here 
we intend to turn ourselves over to the Americans. An urgent order to move came: the Ameri-
cans are withdrawing from Judenburg, and the Russians are entering. We hurry toward Trieben. 
(...) The Russians are in Trieben. We are trapped! On both sides, from Judenburg and Trie-
ben, the Russians are headed toward us. (...) The Poglavnik proposes the forest.” Bracanović 
dated to crossing of the Tauern Alps on 12 May (Dolores BRACANOVIĆ, “S Poglavnikom na 
povlačenju”, Hrvatska – ‘Memorial Edition in Honour of the Unforgettable Poglavnik’, year XIII, 
no. 4-7 (291-294), Buenos Aires 10 April 1960, 18).
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entered a nearby forest. Lisak, Kirin, Pavelić’s son Velimir, Viktor Rebernišak 
and Dolores Bracanović remained with Pavelić at the time.18
Lisak claimed that a military map Velimir Pavelić had with him helped 
them determine the way to Salzburg. (Does this mean that they set off with-
out a map?) They moved “mainly through the forest, avoiding larger settle-
ments, for we did not know if there were already Russian contingents in these 
places. We spent nights in lonely rural cottages, mostly in haylofts, pretend-
ing as though we were accustomed to such travel, to avoid any suspicion of 
our identities. We ate by exchanging food for cigarettes, which the peasants 
were glad to take”.19 From passers-by, they learned “about the zones that had 
been established between the Anglo-Americans and Russians. That’s how we 
learned that the closest access to the Ango-American zone led across the Enns 
River at Untergrinning, where we practically – after about 6 days of moving 
in the Russian zone,20 passed into the Anglo-American zone. (...) Finally in 
Anglo-American territory, we moved onward along the main road. In case we 
were stopped by the Anglo-Americans, we each had personal identity docu-
ments indicating civilian occupations. This sufficed for the moment, because 
the security organs were generally concerned with military personnel, mainly 
seeking and hunting former members of SS units. The roads were thus once 
more full of various civilians, who were workers returning from Germany and 
Austria, so that we were also able to move in the same way without attracting 
any particular attention”.21
After the crossing of the Alps, the American sentries, as Kirin stated, 
“checked their papers and let them through”.22 This should not be surprising, 
18 “Thus, it was agreed that this larger group should split up, with civilians on one side and 
military persons on the other. (...) We were still convinced that our withdrawal was only tempo-
rary” (Interview with Dolores Bracanović conducted by Tomislav Jonjić, published in Politički 
zatvorenik, May 1997, no. 62, 11). Kirin testified that when crossing the Alps they came across 
“a small group of refugees accompanied by the engineer Klaudio Fiedler, an official in the main 
county prefecture. He was retained by the poglavnik, to travel with us, since he was wearing hunt-
ing attire, and besides this he spoke German in the local dialect, so that he could help us secure 
food, seek nightly accommodations and otherwise find our way about. So our group grew to 
seven...” (B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 20.)
19 B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 20.
20 the Soviet presence in this territory was temporary, for the division of Austria in Allied 
zones was carried out in early July 1945, and the Soviet zone covered the north-east section of 
the country.
21 B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 20-21.
22 Ibid., 20. Bracanović also noted different experiences when passing through American check-
points. “13 May – (...) We finally see a bridge, and the Americans approaching the Russians. We 
exploited that moment to cross the bridge”. For 16 May 1945, she stated: “God helped us again. 
The guard left his post for a moment and entered the hut there, and we passed by quickly”. On 
“17 May – Once more we passed by an American sentry, who checked everyone’s papers, except 
for the Poglavnik and myself, for we were the last in the group” (Dolores BRACANOVIĆ, “S 
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since the American sentries very likely did not known who Ante Pavelić was, 
to say nothing of his appearance. Having arrived in the U.S. zone, they found 
the rest of Pavelić’s family, who had been staying in Leingreith, on the road to 
Radstadt.23
Namely, according to Višnja Pavelić, she, her mother and sister left Za-
greb on 12 December 1944 and travelled to Semmering, near Vienna.24 the 
arrangement of accommodations was “handled by the Germans, officials of 
the Reich’s Foreign Ministry, for all persons transferred from Croatia and other 
countries. There were various nationalities, Bulgarians, Romanians, Macedo-
nian Bulgarians, Hungarians, etc. So as the Bolshevik army approached Ger-
man territory, they moved us farther into Austria”. As to how Pavelić managed 
to find his family, Višnja Pavelić testified that they succeeded “at the last mo-
ment, just before the capitulation of the German Reich, to send a message to 
Zagreb with the last courier, that we were accommodated near Salzburg called 
by the generally name Langreith-Hintersee”. Together with the Pavelić fam-
ily in the house in Leingreith “there were the persons who came with us to 
Austria: Mrs. Balen, the wife of Minister Josip Balen, Mrs. Dora Werner, the 
daughter of Zagreb Mayor Ivan Werner, Merica Pavelić, the daughter of the en-
gineer Ante Pavelić, two housemaids who had been with us since 1931, when 
we were émigrés in Italy, the head driver Štef Babić from the Prefecture, honor-
ary battleship Captain Crisomali and Dr. Vladimir Vranjković”. Immediately 
upon arriving, “we all reported to the designated authorities by name. The first 
visit of the American military CIC (Counterintelligence Corps) to Langreith 
was conducted by an American captain, named Messing. He held a very long 
conversation with us”.25
Poglavnikom na povlačenju”, 18).
23 “Crossing the River Enns, we were in the American zone and we thus moved more securely 
toward Radstadt (...) At that moment two women appeared, and the poglavnik rose, approached 
them and they discussed something. When he returned, he told us that he asked them if they 
were any Croatian refugees nearby, and that he had learned that approximately 2 km back from 
where we were, there was a hunting lodge in which a somewhat well-to-do Croatian family was 
living. At this, the poglavnik sent his son and Lisak to see who lived in this hunting lodge. After 
a short time, Lisak returned with the news that the poglavnik’s family was there, i.e., his wife 
and their daughters (Višnja and Mirjana) as well as the wife of Minister Balen with their young 
nephew” (B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 20).
24 At the end of 1944, Foreign Minister Mehmed Alajbegović sent a telegram to the NDH del-
egation in Berlin: “The government’s wish is that first distinguished national activists, youths, 
the wounded and women and children be sent to the Reich, while the government with their 
staffs and high state officials will go last” (B. KRIZMAN, Ustaše i Treći Reich, 200).
25 “As the first we were accommodated behind Semmering, Altausee-Badausee-Salzkammergut, 
and then in the vicinity of Salzburg, on a side road leading to Salzburg, in the Langreith-Hintersee 
section in a lonely hunting lodge in the forest, where Austrian refugee families who fled before the 
Allied bombing of Salzburg were accommodated. (...) We later learned that the owner of the hunt-
ing lodge in the forest, where the refugee families from Salzburg and our entire group had been 
accommodated, was Count Nostiz, a Czech...” (OP, text by Višnja Pavelić entitled “Austrija I.”, 1-3).
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Bracanović set 18 May as the date of arrival of Pavelić’s group in Leingreith. 
She stated that on 20 May, General Moškov and Major Šarić came “on orders”, 
and that Pavelić “sent a message to Dr. Maček via Moškov, that he work for 
Croatia’s interests”. On 1 June Pavelić “reported to the American authorities”.26 
In a post-war inquest, Slavko Kvaternik stated that Crisomali told him that “he 
had reported everyone in the house, including Dr. Pavelić, in writing with all 
names to the American authorities”.27 Thus, Pavelić was reported under his real 
name the first time, although this only lasted for a few days.
After they heard the news of extradition of a part of the NDH government 
“over the radio” on 6 June,28 “we had no other option than to begin thinking 
about how and where to remove the Poglavnik and find him another residence. 
Fortunately, a friend of the local Austrians, Springet, (...) understood the mat-
ter and offered to find another residence for the Poglavnik in the surrounding 
hills”.29 Historian Bogdan Krizman also confirmed that after “the English had 
extradited a part of the NDH government to the Yugoslav authorities”, Pavelić 
“disappeared from Leingreith in mid-June 1945. With an active sense of con-
spiracy, all trace of Pavelić was lost”.30
Pavelić went to his other hiding place by automobile “with an Austrian 
friend31 and our faithful Angelina” (the housemaid with them since the ‘first’ 
exile in Italy). On the way they were stopped by “an American MP [military 
26 D. BRACANOVIĆ, “S Poglavnikom na povlačenju”, p. 19. “While the Poglavnik was still in 
Langreith in the beginning, Moškov came through an established contact from the English zone 
with his ‘trusted’ man, an officer, Šarić. This meeting near the Hintersee near Langreith, was 
also attended only by our sister”. Višnja Pavelić dated the report of all of the new arrivals “to the 
American military authorities” to “the second day of their arrival”. Assuming that this is correct, 
then according to the date of the group’s arrival cited by Bracanović, this would have been 19 
May (OP, text by Višnja Pavelić entitled “Austrija I.”).
27 B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 125.
28 Pavelić did not withdraw together with the NDH government, which had retreated through 
Krapina, Rogaška Slatina, Maribor and Klagenfurt and then to Turracher Höhe, where, based on 
an agreement with the Germans, accommodations had been arranged in three hotels for Prime 
Minister Nikola Mandić, the members of the government with “their families, senior clerks 
and auxiliary staff ”. On 14 May, the members of the government who were at Turracher Höhe 
reported to the command of the British army, which arrested them and turned them over the 
Yugoslav Partisans several days later. Most were condemned to death in early June (For more: 
B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 23-26, note 22-23 and J. JAREB, Zlato i novac NDH, 249-250, 
note 1).
29 OP, text by Višnja Pavelić entitled “Austrija I.”, p. 3. According to Bracanović, Pavelić “early in 
the morning on 7 June left” Langreith (D. BRACANOVIĆ, “S Poglavnikom na povlačenju”, 19).
30  Krizman wrote about Pavelić’s flight from Langreith, mentioning Pavelić’s ties “with sev-
eral priests and monks”, his concealment “in individual Austrian monasteries”, and additionally, 
Pavelić “also, as needed, wore clerical robes to appear convincing as a ‘pious monk’”. Krizman 
did not cite any source for this assertion (B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 146).
31 Pavelić’s younger daughter Mirjana stated: “We came upon an Austrian who saved papa. For 
money” (“Ante Pavelić potpuno je uspio!”, Globus, 22 May 1992, no. 76, 32).
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police] patrol” and then taken in for questioning. After examining their doc-
uments, which were forged,32 they seized their vehicle and let them go. The 
three continued their journey through a forest to Tiefbrunau “to the house of 
a farmer where father was accommodated”. During their stay in Austria, both 
Pavelić and his wife were dressed as typical Austrians. The family regularly 
maintained contacts with Pavelić in his new residence; Višnja and her sister 
walked “over the surrounding hills 6-7 hours there and back”. Pavelić remained 
in Tiefbrunnau “until the month of September”, and “only his family and the 
late Prof. Dolores Bracanović knew” about his stay.33
Several days after Pavelić left Langreith, “a military delegation came from 
Salzburg, among them a Serb wearing an American military uniform, and they 
interrogated the families and others present in order to strong-arm us into 
revealing the Poglavnik’s whereabouts”.34
Given that the owner of the house in which Pavelić’s family had been stay-
ing up to that point returned and demanded that all refugees vacate it, Captain 
Messing arranged to accommodate the family “in the village of St. Gilgen35 on 
the Wolfgangsee, and in boarding-house named the Vila Helene36 – owned by 
a Mrs. Ellmauer, which was two houses down from the headquarters of the 
American military police, the CIC, obviously in order to keep better tabs on 
us”. After accommodation in St. Gilgen, the family also “received” a new CIC 
captain – Johnson.37 In their first interview, “he asked if we had a photograph 
32  “The township of St. Gilgen received the lorry of our embassy from Vienna and the consu-
late in Graz, and they had everything necessary to make documents, which we also used, made 
out to various names, while in exile” (OP, text by Višnja Pavelić entitled “Austrija I.”, p. 8). There 
could not have been an “embassy” in Vienna, for embassies could only be located where a head 
of state or a national government had its seat. Extraordinary circumstances (such as the spring 
of 1945 in Berlin) could have led to a de facto transfer, but formally the Croatian embassy to the 
Third Reich was and remained in Berlin.
In the memorandum “Ustasha Activity in Land Salzburg”, which was compiled in early October 
1945 by U.S. counterintelligence operatives, it is noted that the Croatian Red Cross was issuing 
forged documents and travel passes (National Archives and Records Administration (Records 
of the Army Staff (Records Group 319), Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Collection, Records 
of the Investigative Records Repository (IRR), IRR Case Files: Impersonal Files 1940-1976, Box 
62, File ZF015107, Ustasha Project, 2 Folders, 1945-1949 (hereinafter: NARA, RG 319, Box 62, 
Ustasha Project).
33 OP, text by Višnja Pavelić entitled “Nekoliko podataka iz ‘45.”, 1. and Razgovor sa Dolores 
Bracanović, 13.
34 OP, text by Višnja Pavelić entitled “Austrija I.”, 6. and BRACANOVIĆ, “S Poglavnikom na 
povlačenju”, 19.
35 Slavko Kvaternik had heard that the Pavelić family was accommodated in “a hotel on the lake 
at the village of St. Gilgen and that they were interned there by the American authorities, but 
they could move about freely”. (B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 126).
36 “Mrs. Turina was placed in a ground-floor room with her daughter, while Minister Turina 
was lying ill in the hospital” (OP, text by Višnja Pavelić entitled “Austrija I.”, 7).
37 A certain officer named Johnson is also mentioned in the literature, but as a colonel (Guy 
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of father”, and after “he inspected it carefully, he said: ‘Well, I could recognize 
that man quickly and very easily!’”38 However, Pavelić would, according to his 
own account, pass right next to the CIC building when changing hideouts, and 
obviously went unrecognized and unnoticed.
For some time now, the relevant literature, both Croatian and foreign, has 
featured theories on Pavelić’s deals and arrangements with both British and 
U.S. intelligence agencies.39 However, evidence more substantial than state-
ments by individuals40 and intelligence documents of questionable veracity 
have thus far not been found.41 According to the Pavelić family, the CIC officer, 
Captain Messing, was “well-mannered, as opposed to the savage behaviour of 
the army, which looted wherever it could”.42 However, “the Americans knew 
where Pavelić’s daughter was staying, for she claimed that she and her fam-
ily had to report in regularly. If the Americans had wanted to locate Pavelić’s 
hideout, they could have simply followed his daughter on the numerous occa-
sions when she visited him in the forests next to Saint Gilgen”. According to 
this same author, “this suggests that they probably already knew his location 
and they left him alone”.43
The Yugoslav side did not have accurate data “on Pavelić and his move-
ments in Austria”, except to the extent “that was necessary for the restitution 
WALTERS, Lov na zločince, Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak, 2009, 118). I could not establish as to 
whether this was the same person, and whether Višnja Pavelić incorrectly cited his rank.
38 OP, text by Višnja Pavelić entitled “Austrija I.”, 7.
39 The best known are two popular history books: Mark AARONS, John LOFTUS, Unholy Trin-
ity. The Vatican, the Nazis, and the Swiss Banks, New York, 1998; Uki GONI, The Real Odessa. 
How Peron Brought the Nazi War Criminals to Argentina, London and New York, 2002.
40 Moškov had heard “that Pavelić had contacts with the Americans and that an American 
major visited him constantly”. When he asked Pavelić about this, the latter “laughed and said 
that just a little earlier he – meaning the American – had just left” (B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjek-
stvu, 120). Slavko Kvaternik had also heard “that at the time prior to Pavelić’s disappearance, no 
uniformed Americans came to the manor, rather only a single civilian whom he did not know 
and who only spoke English, and it was striking that this civilian visited Pavelić a day before his 
disappearance” (Ibid., 125).
41 “Pavelić’s relations with the British have been the subject of many conspiracy theories, of 
which some may indeed contain a grain of truth. Certainly, the Russians, Yugoslavs and Ameri-
cans believed that Pavelić had concluded some kind of agreement with the British, who gave 
him some freedom or held him secretly as a captive” (Guy WALTERS, Lov na zločince, 116-117).
42 “Thus in St. Gilgen they came to Mrs. Košak who, as their commander told me, directed 
them to us, saying, ‘Go to Pavelić family, and you’ll find more than we have!’ Truly about two 
dozen American wild men came with their commander and ransacked the garage of the hunt-
ing lodge, where all the residents – refugees – had their suitcases or other things, and began to 
take whatever they found. (...) They took a car, pour souvenir – as a memento, as they put it, but 
mostly they were interested in cameras, radio sets, hunting rifles and certain other items that 
were the property of the house’s owner. They also took two radio sets and my Leica camera” (OP, 
text by Višnja Pavelić entitled “Austrija I.”, 6).
43 Guy WALTERS, Lov na zločince, 119.
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delegation to more easily locate the hidden property (treasures) which Pavelić 
took with him in his flight across the border to Austria”. They learned “that 
Pavelić and his entourage were lingering in the American zone, near a salt 
mine”.44 According to one account, in mid-May “a sudden change transpired 
in the bearing of the British command staffs. Obviously the orders from their 
superiors were such. Not only did not want to extradite Quislings to us, they 
also began to exert pressure on us in every way and call on us to depart from 
Carinthia”.45 The conclusion that “the majority of the Ustasha and Ustasha 
leadership together with Pavelić at their head had withdrawn to the British 
occupation zone in May 1945” also indicates that the Yugoslav side did not 
have accurate data on Pavelić’s hideaway, for only several days after arriving in 
Austria, he had crossed into the American zone.46
During this time, the Yugoslav government pressured London and Wash-
ington to secure Pavelić’s extradition. The British ambassador to Belgrade, 
Ralph Skrine Stevenson, in a cable to the Foreign Office dated 20 June 1945, 
proposed “that all Yugoslavs now in Allied hands” for whom there is irrefut-
able evidence of guilt, should be handed over as soon as possible. He noted that 
Pavelić was among those for whom there was irrefutable evidence. The am-
bassador stated: “We surely have already sufficient evidence ourselves against 
such people both to make supply of further evidence by Yugoslav Government 
unnecessary and to satisfy ourselves that their request is genuine. Delay on our 
part would arouse deepest suspicion of our motives. The positive advantage of 
handing them over now as opposed to later on”. The ambassador stressed that 
“such a step would be well received in Yugoslavia” and would “divert public 
attention at least temporarily from Mihailovic and Macek”.47
44 Krizman cited the testimony of Ivan Kreft, who was the chief of “our restitution delega-
tion attached to the Mission, later the Representative Office”, and alleged: “Somewhat later, after 
Pavelić had fled from Austria to Italy, the Americans (Major Weber) called Kreft and asked him 
to ascertain together with them whether the property was stored in twenty large travel cases 
of Yugoslav origin. These cases were hidden in one of the trenches of an abandoned salt mine 
near Salzburg. The Americans were well aware that this was a part of Pavelić’s luggage, but they 
reported it only several months after Pavelić had left Austria and took up residence in Italy, and 
this was – Kreft alleged – to mislead our investigators. However, our Commission led by Col. 
Kovačević knew well that Pavelić was no longer in Austria since October 1946” (B. KRIZMAN, 
Pavelić u bjekstvu, 146-147).
45 “This was the end of cooperation. Every day the pressure became greater and we were in a 
difficult position. The British began to behave aggressively and callously” (Ibid., 148).
46 “Nonetheless, it was not difficult to conclude that the British intelligence service was apprised, 
that it had its interests in the matter, and probably some arrangements with individuals. (...) The 
interests of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition came into conflict in Austrian territory. Austria, 
and Vienna in particular, were the hubs at which their intelligence agencies, and others, were 
intensively active. Incursions and counter-incursions, double agents, provocations, kidnappings, 
murders and similar ‘receptions’ blossomed like nowhere before at that time” (Ibid., 148).
47 The National Archive: Public Record Office (hereinafter: TNA: PRO), London, Foreign Of-
fice: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966 (hereinafter: FO 371) 
48890, R 10676, 1.
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In early July 1945, the Yugoslav ambassador in London, Ljubo Leontić, in-
formed the Foreign Office that Pavelić “has been made prisoner by the troops 
of Field Marshal Alexander, and that he is now in the part of Austria under the 
control of the British Army”. The Yugoslav ambassador “begs the Foreign Of-
fice to take the necessary steps in order that the Military Authorities in Austria 
may hand Dr. Pavelic over to the Yugoslav Authorities as soon as possible”.48 
On this line, on 12 July the Foreign Office sent a query to its political repre-
sentative in Caserta, Philip Broad, whether Pavelić “should properly be con-
sidered as having been captured and/or as being detained by Allied (British-
American) forces or by purely British force”.49 Ambassador Leontić received 
a response on 9 October: “Every effort is being made to discover the present 
whereabouts of Dr. Pavelic”.50 U.S. agencies were also seeking “any informa-
tion” on Pavelić’s whereabouts in early July.51
The U.S. State Department also gave its opinion on these demands. On 
16 July 1945, the British ambassador in Washington, D.C., Edward Frederick 
Lindley Wood, informed the Foreign Office as follows: “State Department says 
that up to the present they have received no (repeat no) information from 
Caserta to indicate that the Allies are holding any of the persons named in 
Yugoslav Government’s note”.52 Furthermore, the State Department issued 
instructions to its representatives in Caserta “that if any of these persons fall 
into Allied hands they should not (repeat not) at present, be turned over to 
Yugoslav Government although State Department think they will eventually 
have to be handed over. Before they would agree to this, State Department 
would wish (a) to know the charges upon which the Yugoslav Government’s 
claim is based and (b) to be satisfied that the accused would receive a reasonably 
48 TNA: PRO, FO 371/48890, R 11462. On 7 July Ambassador Stevenson announced that “in 
today’s press” the demand of the State Commission on Investigation into the Crimes of the Oc-
cupiers and their Accomplices was published, in which they first and foremost sought Pavelić’s 
extradition, and claimed “that Pavelic is in the hands of the Allies” (TNA: PRO, FO 371/48890, 
R 11586). On 2 July, Stevenson also informed London of 46 death sentences in Zagreb, of which 
33 persons were members of the Ustasha movement, 7 were Catholic priests, and 6 priests of the 
Croatian Orthodox Church (TNA: PRO, FO 371/48890, R 11688).
49 “We are of course in any case consulting the United States Government about the action 
which we propos(e) to take; but we also wish to know whether the eventual repl(y) to the Yu-
goslav Government should be made by ourselves alon(e) or jointly by ourselves and the Ameri-
cans” (TNA: PRO, FO 371/48890).
50 TNA: PRO, FO 371/48892, R 16234., 157.
51 NARA, RG 319, Entry 134 B, box 173, Apprehension of Croat Quislings, 5 July 1945. (I owe 
a debt of gratitude to Jure Krišto, Ph.D., for making these documents available.) A former U.S. 
intelligence operative stated that: “The American intelligence agencies in Austria were not in the 
business of catching Yugoslav war criminals. Their job was gathering current intelligence on the 
Soviet armies, not exacting retribution for past crimes” (James V. MILANO – Patrick BROGAN, 
Soldiers, Spies and the Rat Line. America’s Undeclared War Against the Soviets, Washington-Lon-
don, 1995, 53).
52  TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48891, R 12114.
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fair trial. State Department would like to have a further exchange of views 
with you on this subject if and when any of the persons named in Yugoslav 
Government’s note fall into Allied hands”.53 The Foreign Office responded on 
22 July 1945 that it has no news on Pavelić, but that it agrees with the Yugoslav 
government’s demand that in the case of Pavelić and Nedić there was a “prima 
facie case of guilt” [underlined in original] for their extradition. It stressed that 
they “were overt collaborators with the enemy and their case is therefore of a 
different nature from that of Mihailovic”.54 However, the British were aware of 
the type of trail those extradited would receive in Yugoslavia, so they adopted 
a pragmatic stance. They responded to the State Department: “It is in fact 
unlikely that any Yugoslav trial would be considered satisfactory by British 
or American standards, and even if verbal assurances are given in general 
terms they are not likely to be worth much. Any attempt to put forth detailed 
requirements on our part as regards trial will be much resented and it seems to 
us probably wiser not to attempt anything of this kind”.55
According to a report submitted by Marion H. Scott, the Deputy Regional 
Public Safety Officer with the Allied Military Government, on 29 July, Ante 
Pavelić’s whereabouts were known, however a precise location was not speci-
fied.56 On the other hand, in a reported dated 5 November 1945, he stated: 
“Subject is believed to be in custody in the United States Zone, but his exact 
location is unknown”.57 In his second report of 26 July, Scott proposed that 
he or some other Allied officer should cooperate with Tito’s representative to 
locate the fugitives, especially Pavelić. He saw this as all the more important 
because Tito thought “that the ‘Western Allies’ have no interest whatever in his 
enemies”. He and agent Heda Stern dedicated special effort to investigating the 
Salzburg zone because there were leads which interested them with regard to 
their investigation.58
A senior agent from the Allied Command for the Rome region, Gono 
Morena, sent a query to the Counterintelligence Corps on 8 August 1945 to as-
certain whether Pavelić was in Rome and possibly in the Institute of St. Jerome. 
53 Ibid.
54 TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48891, R 1214., 2.
55 “There is in our opinion no doubt that all three puppet Yugoslav administrations – the Ser-
bian Government, the Croatian Government and the Provincial Administration of Ljubljana 
– were active accessories in the enemy’s war effort over a long period; and we consider that any 
Minister or leading personality of those administrations is rightly regarded by the Yugoslav 
Government as a traitor to the Yugoslav State. We should therefore consider evidence of an in-
dividual in our custody having participated in any of those three administrations as constituting 
a satisfactory prima facie case” (Ibid., 2).
56 NARA, RG 319, Box 62, Ustasha Project, Marion H. Scott AFHQ, 26 July 1945.
57 NARA, RG 319, Entry 134B, box 173.
58 NARA, RG 319, Box 62, Ustasha Project, 1946. Recently this intelligence duo’s intrigu-
ing post-war search for Pavelić received some scholarly attention (Jure KRIŠTO, “Zagrebačka 
Židovka Heda Stern u lovu na Pavelića”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 42/1, 2010, 55-72).
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If Pavelić were indeed in Rome, he ordered his arrest.59 The CIC responded on 
25 August 1945, and sent him a newspaper article which claimed that Pavelić 
had been arrested a day earlier in Austria, and awaiting extradition to Yugo-
slavia. In this regard, he was advised that the Pavelić case was deemed closed.60
Unverified information and other rumours continued to serve as the sole 
leads.61 Thus, on 27 August 1945, Ambassador Stevenson asked the Foreign Of-
fice the basis for the BBC’s report “that the Allied High Command in Austria 
has decided to hand over Pavelic to the Yugoslav authorities”. He also asked: 
“Did Pavelic fall into Soviet hands?”62 The response from London on 31 Au-
gust was that the “report was broadcast by the Russian-controlled Berlin radio 
on August 22nd and quoted by the B.B.C. on August 23rd”. In case “Pavelic has 
not yet been found in the territory of Allied Force Headquarters, I suggest that 
His Majesty’s Ambassador in Moscow should enquire whether he is in Soviet 
custody”.63 Clark Kerr, the ambassador in Moscow, responded negatively to 
this query on 14 December.64 The Yugoslav ambassador repeated the demand 
for Pavelić’s extradition on 30 August, claiming that the British were holding 
him in captivity in Klagenfurt.65 Even the investigation conducted by the Al-
lied command in Caserta did not succeed. So on 9 September 1945 it notified 
the Foreign Office that “there is no trace of Pavelic in this theatre as yet”.66 the 
response from London on 12 September advised them to verify the latest ru-
mours: “There is a story current among the Yugoslav Royalist officers interned 
in Germany that Pavelic is disguised as a monk in a monastery at Klagenfurt. 
This might conceivably be worth investigating”.67
59 NARA, RG 319, Entry 134 B, box 173.
60 NARA, RG 319, Entry 134 B, box 173, 26 August 1945 and the memorandum “Pavelić, Ante” 
of 25 August 1945.
61 “The CIC’s agents themselves could be very unprofessional in their intelligence gathering. 
Richard West, a member of a British intelligence unit in Trieste in 1949, recalled that he had 
met a CIC agent who had been dismissed because his superiors found out how he performed his 
duties. ‘He got hold of some Albanian newspapers’, West said, ‘and gave them to some Albanian 
who translated some utter foolishness. He would submit the translation as being from ‘his’ man 
in Tirana. That was when I understood how silly most intelligence agencies were’ (Guy WAL-
TERS, Lov na zločince, 118) “...and today we know that the Allied agencies did not have much 
better evidence on their hideouts, so they fell prey to various rumours and unverified informa-
tion” (J. KRIŠTO, “Zagrebačka Židovka Heda Stern u lovu na Pavelića”, 60).
62 TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48892, R 14477.
63 “We have a right to ask since Yugoslav Government believe he is in our custody and have 
requested his surrender” (TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48892, R 14477). The Foreign Office assessed that 
the BBC’s report “is incorrect”, stating “We are still waiting for the State Dept. to make up their 
minds on Pavelic” (TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48868, R 14297, 26. VIII. 1945. Handwritten note on the 
file’s folder).
64 TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48894, R 21039.
65 TNA: PRO, FO 371/48892, R 14839.
66 TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48892, R 14477.
67 Ibid.
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Ambassador Halifax announced on 22 September: “The United States 
Government considers that the Yugoslav Government have made out a prima 
facie [underlined in original] case against Pavelic”. Additionally, the “Anglo-
American authorities are continuing their efforts  to ascertain the present 
whereabouts of Pavelic”.68 The command in Caserta responded to another For-
eign Office query on Croatian quislings on 1 October 1945 that Allied forces 
“have not yet succeeded in tracing these men”.69 It should be borne in mind 
that according to the intelligence data of the time, from August 1945 to Janu-
ary 1946, thus at the time when Pavelić was hiding in Austria, the number 
of displaced persons (DPs) in Austria ranged from 400,000 to slightly above 
300,000.70
A year later, Pavelić himself described his stay in Austria, in Tiefbrunnau. 
American units in Salzburg and its environs “passed through daily in their 
jeeps”, although “they were not overly concerned with identifying the refugees 
who were in the villages in a rather high number. These were mostly Volks-
deutscher who had fled from Romania. Only once did they ask at the neigh-
bouring house whether there were any Croatian refugees, to which the Volks-
deutscher responded negatively, not knowing about me, because I was consid-
ered Austrian”. Not long afterward, “when the Austrian local authorities were 
once more allowed to organize their own gendarmerie, Austrian gendarmes 
came to the village very often”. Thus, on one occasion, a “gendarme sergeant 
from Faistenau” questioned Pavelić’s “peasant who owned the house, about 
who I was and where I was from?” After this Pavelić changed his residence.71 
According to his own account, he travelled along the railway tracks “from Bad 
Ischl to Salzburg, even passing the house in which the local American secret 
military police, the CIC, was accommodated, and arrived at AICH, where a 
68 TNA: PRO, FO 371/48892, R 16234, 1 and 2.
69 TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48891, R 12813.
70 “The displaced person problem in Austria is more complex. Over four-fifths of the displaced 
persons in Austria are in the American zone, and the majority represent German minorities 
from south-eastern Europe” (Intelligence review, no.1, 14 February 1946. Military Intelligence 
Division, War Department, Washington, D.C., p. 53 and tables on p. 54).
71 “One day a gendarme sergeant from Faistenau came and asked the house owner farmer who 
I was and where I was from. He told him I was an Austrian from Linz. The gendarme sergeant 
was not satisfied with this response, and he wished to speak with me personally. I was outside 
the house at the time, strolling along a small stream ... (...) I approached the house (...) but 
waited, looking in from close by, to see how long the gendarme was willing to wait – and meet 
me. When an hour passed, the gendarme said he had waited for nothing. I finally decided to 
approach and then enter the house. There I learned from the owner/farmer, that the gendarme 
wanted to know who I was and what I was doing in the village, but since he could no longer wait, 
I left a message for me to come to Faistenau in the afternoon – a place only a few kilometres 
away, where the gendarme barracks were. I had no intention of going there, rather I gathered a 
few of my things, put them in a rucksack and told the peasant I was going to Faistenau. However, 
instead of Faistenau (...) I went through a forest (...) to St. Gilgen on the St. Wolfgang Lake” (OP, 
“Austrija – svibanj 1945-srpanj 1946.”, 1).
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well-known Macedonian family named Zilev was staying”.72 Commenting on 
his flight from Tiefbrunnau, Pavelić said that he thought that “in the time it 
takes Austrian gendarmes to ascertain whether I’m an Austrian or a Croat 
while already in custody, I’d have been identified ten times by Yugoslav com-
munist spies, who were spread throughout Austrian territory, and then seized 
and taken to Tito’s paradise, all under the noses of the Austrian gendarmes and 
American military police. Honouring that old Latin saying, periculum in mora, 
salvus in fuga, I left before that Austrian gendarme could return...” He stayed 
with the Zilev family “for several weeks, while an Austrian friend obtained a 
new identity card under a different name, making it possible to stay at another 
place. This other place was called Obertrum, a small, pleasant village near the 
shores of the lake Mattsee, in the same province, about 20 kilometres from 
the city of Salzburg. The village had about thirty houses, all five hundred to 
a thousand meters from each other, all farming estates”. Here as well, he was 
accommodated “in a farmer’s house, about a kilometre from the village, where 
I was able to stay in peace until the month of April in the next year (1946). I 
helped the farmer do his work, especially in his workshop, in which he had an 
electric circular saw all carpentry tools, as well as a smithy, which all Austrian 
farmers had to fix their farm machinery. With time I became acquainted with 
all of the peasants whom I met on their fields, and especially every Sunday in 
the parish church. I had a reputation as a specialized worker, who spent a great 
deal of time in Trieste, but then returned to Austria – as a result of the new 
situation that ensued after the war”.73
By all indications, Pavelić considered his departure from Croatia tempo-
rary.74 His closest friends, Lisak and Kirin, left Leingreith before Pavelić, thus 
prior to 7 June, with the intent of returning to Croatia. According to statements 
made during an investigation, Lisak spoke of this in advance with Pavelić, who 
“responded that we had to be patient and wait for a time, to see how circum-
stances would unfold”.75 Kirin struck the same tone in the investigation, stating 
that he believed “that if Lisak had in fact met with the Poglavnik, he certainly 
72 “Zilev, a Bulgarian-Macedonian politician, a member of IMRO, an older associate on the 
émigré scene. We were all accommodated in the Austrian section near Wolfgangsee and we had 
joint contacts. Zilev had died during the withdrawal from Macedonia” (Ibid., 2, note by Višnja 
Pavelić).
73 Ibid., 2.
74 Moškov testified that Pavelić told him in Austria “that Yugoslavia as it had been certainly will 
certainly never be established again. (...) Our last exile lasted 12 years, if this one lasts 12 months 
it will be long. (...) We also spoke about how they (the Supreme Command) had left without any 
reason whatsoever. He told there was no longer any point in waiting due to the approach of the 
Russians” (B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 120).
75 “I did not speak of this again with the poglavnik, but I decided to take the first opportunity 
to go to the homeland at my own risk to operate in line with Ustasha principles” (B. KRIZMAN, 
Pavelić u bjekstvu, 21). On the activities of so-called ‘Crusader’ groups, of which the best known 
was Kavran’s, see: Z. RADELIĆ, Križari..., 115-239.
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could not have received any task, because in that general lack of informa-
tion even the Poglavnik could not have been apprised of the situation, neither 
abroad nor especially at home, so I believe that as a result not even Lisak could 
have been given any special mission”.76 Pavelić and Moškov met in Austria sev-
eral times. During one of these meetings, Pavelić – according to Moškov – said 
“he was even prepared to return to Croatia (...) but that everything had to have 
‘a head and a tail’”.77 Otherwise, the two of them parted ways, for after a time 
Moškov refused to comply with Pavelić on the matter of use of the gold that 
had been taken from Croatia in May 1945.78
The manhunt for Pavelić by Western agencies and the Yugoslav demands 
continued. A U.S. report dated 2 October 1945 contained the claim that “a 
substantial group of Ustasha are still at large in the St. Gilgen area and are cur-
rently being investigated”. It is assumed that they had contacts with Ustasha in 
76 B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 125.
77 Ibid., 123. Namely, according to Moškov, among the refugees in Austria, “news was spread-
ing that the entire territory was in battle against the Partisans” (Ibid., 126-127). With reference 
to the extradition of Croatian soldiers and civilians by the British, Pavelić told him “that he had 
already been informed of this, but that this certainly had to have been done by some English 
commander at his own discretion. (...) He once more stressed that any possibility that they were 
handed over by the English” (Ibid., 120). “I remember well, Katja and I waited for Kavran in 
Linz on Easter itself. He learned of my whereabouts from the Poglavnik’s family, and he came 
to the Poglavnik in order to obtain permission to conduct a campaign of sending volunteers to 
the Homeland. Božo told me that the Poglavnik expressly opposed such actions. As a seasoned 
illegal operative and revolutionary, he warned Kavran that circumstances in both the Homeland 
and in the world were not such as to offer any kind of prospects for success, and even though 
Božo was troubled by the Poglavnik’s stance, he could not be dissuaded” (Razgovor sa Dolores 
Bracanović, 13).
78 In this exhaustive study, Jere Jareb ascertained that on 7 May 1945, approximately 290 kg of 
gold, a large sum of foreign currency, the large stamp collection of the Postal Directorate and a 
small quantity of jewels were removed from the Croatian State Bank in two lorries and the au-
tomobile of Minister Mirko Puk. The fate of the lorry carrying the stamp collection in 18 boxes 
after stopping along a road in Austria remains unknown. Puk’s automobile carrying 2 cases 
of gold and a high quantity of foreign currency, was attacked by the Partisans, who probably 
seized these valuables. However, the other lorry contained 12 cases of gold, foreign currency 
and a small quantity of jewels. The Ustasha distributed the contents of one case of gold among 
themselves, while the remainder was stored in a Franciscan monastery in Wolfsberg. Thereafter, 
the priest Krunoslav Draganović took a smaller quantity of gold with him to Rome, while the 
remainder was buried near Radstadt. Božidar Kavran and Lovro Sušić were aware of this, while 
the gold was under the care of Frane Šarić who, together with Moškov and Major Marko Čavić, 
was hiding at another location near Radstadt, and they refused to turn the gold over to Pavelić. 
It is known that Moškov gave Kavran 1,037 gold coins at Pavelić’s behest; however, the fate of 
the remaining gold remains unknown to this day (J. JAREB, Zlato i novac NDH …, 348-356). In 
Carinthia, Draganović learned “that 400 kg of god from the Croatian State Bank and a rucksack 
full of foreign paper currency and other valuables are hidden in Wolfsberg”. He took 40 kg with 
the permission of Sušić and Milas (For more see Miroslav AKMADŽA, Krunoslav Draganović – 
Iskazi komunističkim istražiteljima, Zagreb, 2010, 109-113).
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the British zone in Spital, Klagenfurt and Villach.79 At the end of October, an 
agreement was confirmed between the State Department and Foreign Office 
that Pavelić “should be turned over to the Yugoslavs”.80 On 10 December 1945, 
Ambassador Leontić wrote to British Foreign Secretary Ernest Blevin about 
the erroneous interpretation of the procedures surrounding the extradition 
of war criminals,81 to which he received a response on 19 December that they 
had “sent further instructions to His Majesty’s Representatives in Italy and in 
the British zones in Germany and Austria, to ensure that all possible steps are 
taken to discover the whereabouts of those traitors”. Ultimately, the ambas-
sador’s attention was turned “to a leading article published in Borba on 14th 
December, alleging that the Allied Governments had failed to hand over Nedic 
and Pavelic to the Yugoslav authorities in spite of the fact that the Yugoslav 
authorities had given precise information about the town and street in which 
these men are living”. Leontić was told that “every allegation which has been 
made concerning the whereabouts of these two men has been carefully inves-
tigated” but that all had proven “to be entirely without foundation”. The British 
government “will be glad to follow up any new clues which may in fact lead 
to the arrest”.82 On 17 December, in response to all information received from 
the Yugoslav side, the Foreign Office asserted: “Pavelic is not (1) Disguised as 
a monk in a monastery near Klagenfurt. (2) Living in a villa at Klagenfurt. (3) 
In Soviet hands. We have told the Yugoslavs that we are most willing to hand 
him over to them when we find him, and the military authorities in Austria 
will have to continue their search. (...) There is now a letter from Vienna saying 
that he cannot be found”.83
Just how zealous and persistent the Yugoslav Embassy was in sending 
queries about Pavelić is reflected in a comment made by John Colville from 
the Foreign Office’s Southern Department, recorded on 22 December: “As the 
Yugoslav Embassy bombard us with notes about Pavelic etc. I suggest a little 
counter-battery work”.84 At the end of December 1945, they noted: “We have 
repeatedly told the Yugoslavs that we have not got Nedic or Pavelic, but they 
cannot get out of their heads the idea that we are harbouring these men for 
some hidden reactionary purpose of our own”.85 After everything, probably due 
79 NARA, RG319, Box 62, Ustasha Project, 2.
80 TNA: PRO, WO 204/2194, 31 and 41A.
81 TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48894, R 20950.
82 TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48894, R 20967. These same allegations from the daily newspaper Poli-
tika were cited in the article “Belgrade seeks puppets”, The New York Times, 16 December 1945, 2.
83 TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48894, R 21039. Hand-written note on the file’s jacket. Stevenson re-
ported that Belgrade daily Borba of 15 December reported “in a forceful article demanding the 
return of war criminals”, while the “plea that British authorities could not determine the wherea-
bouts of Nedic and Pavelic despite exact information”, was assessed as “thoroughly unconvinc-
ing” (TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48894, R 21281).
84 TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48894, R 21193. Hand-written note on the file’s jacket.
85 On 20 December 1945, the Foreign Office, after being visited by the Yugoslav ambassador 
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to the fact that they were unable to convince Belgrade that they had nothing to 
do with Pavelić’s concealment,86 the Foreign Office asserted on 24 December 
that Pavelić and Nedić were “probably hiding in the French or American zones 
in Austria”.87 With reference to the knowledge of Allied officials in the field, the 
following is interesting: “The Political Director in Carinthia, who was asked 
whether Pavlevitch was in Klagenfurt, did not know who Pavlevitch was!”88
According to the testimony of Dinko Šakić, he and Jakov Džal prepared the 
next hideaways for Pavelić. These were Wolfnitz and Pustriz in Carinthia (Brit-
ish occupation zone). They rented a room in the village of Pustriz, and pre-
sented Pavelić as a father-in-law in Vienna.89 After Pavelić’s arrival, in March 
1946, Šakić moved to Pustriz, while Džal and Pavelić resided in Wolfnitz.90 As 
a reserve residence for Pavelić, Šakić arranged a room in the municipality of 
Granitztal with the Baumgartner family, and registered under the name Petar 
Andoš. Pavelić used this room when anyone visited him and if his first resi-
dence became threatened.91 According to the same source, Pavelić stayed in 
Wolfnitz for six months.92 After intensification of the “combing” of Steiermark 
and then Carinthia by Yugoslav agents “with an English blessing and accompa-
nied by Austrian local bureaucrats”, preparations for Pavelić’s transfer to Italy 
began.93
who primarily mentioned the case of extradition of Pavelić and Nedić, among other things, re-
sponded that “at some time the policy of reconciliation must prevail” in Yugoslavia (TNA: PRO, 
FO 371/ 48894, R 21443., 139).
86 Stalin himself accused Churchill, after the latter’s “Iron Curtain” speech, of intending to re-
turn Pavelić and Mihailović to authority in Yugoslavia: “Churchill wants to assure us that these 
gentlemen who came from the Fascist circles will establish and guarantee complete democracy. 
Such is the democracy of Churchill” (“Stalin Brands Churchill ‘Warmonger and Liar’”, Los Ange-
les Times, 14 March 1946, 1).
87 TNA: PRO, FO 371/ 48894, R 21409.
88 TNA: PRO, FO 371/55252, Confidential – Report of the Labour members of the parliamen-
tary delegation to Austria, January 8th-18th 1946, 7.
89 Dinko ŠAKIĆ, S poglavnikom u Alpama, Split 2001, 80-81.
90 According to Višnja Pavelić, this was “a peasant house owned by a certain Kanika (not in any 
house of Šakić, as he boasted and wrote among his lies), in which Minister Lovro Sušić resided 
before my father” (“Put mog otca Ante Pavelića od Austrije i Italije do Argentine i Španjolske”, 
Hrvatski list, 25 December 2008, 27-28). Radelić stated that Pavelić “in March 1946, judging by 
the UDBa’s claims, transferred to the English zone with the help of American intelligence opera-
tives. He stayed with Col. Jakov Džal...” (Z. RADELIĆ, Križari..., 48). During his stay in Wolfnitz 
in July 1946, Pavelić himself compiled the leaflet on “The NDH in the forests on 10 April 1946”. 
It was compiled so as to create the impression that it was published by the ‘Crusaders’ in Croatia. 
The most important thing was to convince émigrés that there was a Crusader movement”. (Z. 
RADELIĆ, Križari..., 65).
91 For more, D. ŠAKIĆ, S poglavnikom u Alpama, 78-105.
92 This information was also confirmed by Višnja Pavelić: “For fifteen (15) months, my father 
stayed in Austria...” (“Put mog otca Ante Pavelića od Austrije i Italije do Argentine i Španjolske”, 27).
93 D. ŠAKIĆ, S poglavnikom u Alpama, 95.
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France Hočevar94 described the operations of the Military Mission of the 
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, in which he was “charged with political 
coordination of all Yugoslav missions operating at that time in Austria”. Despite 
obstructions by “the American military police”, which “violated the diplomatic 
immunity of our delegation and blockaded the premises of the military mis-
sion”, they secured “a rather good overview of the situation and the activities 
of emigrants”.95 As to the search for Pavelić, Hočevar stated: “In the late spring 
of 1946 these comrades obtained sound insight into Ustasha courier ties, par-
ticularly those who maintained contacts between the Ustasha in the British 
and American occupation zones. (...) We ascertained that Pavelić was hiding in 
monasteries and parish rectories and often changing his hideouts. He had no 
immediate accompaniment, and he kept in touch with his associates by means 
of couriers. His family lived separately from him, at that time also in the Ameri-
can zone. (...) Finally we managed to determine Pavelić’s current hiding place. 
The final preparations had been made, and even a day for his arrest had been set. 
But after this we learned that at the last moment Pavelić eluded arrest, changed 
his hideout and then quickly left Austria”.96 For Yugoslavia had a delegation in 
the British occupation zone, but only under the condition that it investigate 
non-Yugoslavs.97 However, it would be naïve to believe that the Yugoslav side 
fully adhered to this agreement. In mid-May 1946, the Americans announced 
that they had no objections to the Yugoslav side conducting a search for Pavelić 
in the American occupation zone in Austria.98 However, at that time Pavelić was 
no longer in the American zone, but rather in the British zone.
On 21 May 1946, the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps received information 
from a confidential informant, who heard that Pavelić was “in good health” 
in a hotel in St. Gilgen, and that his “wife and daughter are also living in St. 
Gilgen”.99 On the other hand, also in May 1946, rumours were spreading that 
94 “Our Military Mission was active in Austria seated in Vienna during the initial phase of the 
Allied occupation, headed by Col. Vladimir Vodopivec, having Dr. France Hočevar as his politi-
cal advisor...” (B. KRIZMAN, Pavelić u bjekstvu, 146).
95 “This excess by the American military police, which arose because we allegedly impinged 
upon the interests of the American secret police among the Ustasha, only proved to us that there 
were certain underground ties which meant that we had to be more alert, and more penetrating” 
(Ibid., 148-149).
96 “This was done in such a rush that he left his family where they were until then, and he did 
not even manage to take his bags. I later gave these to the Americans. (...) I cannot ascertain with 
any certainty the reasons why the operation to arrest Pavelić did not succeed. The manner of his 
sudden flight from his hideout and his departure from Austria nonetheless indicate that he had 
to have been warned that we were closing in on him and that Austria was no longer safe for him” 
(Ibid., 149).
97 TNA: PRO, FO 945/342.
98 Ibid. 
99 NARA, RG319, Box 62, Ustasha Project, Ustasha activities in St. Gilgen, Vienna City, 21 May 
1946.
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Pavelić was in Rome under the protection of the Vatican and that he “frequenti 
segreti rapporti con Monsignor Montini”.100
Conclusion
The hundreds of thousands of Croats who attempted to find refuge from 
advancing communist forces with the Western Allies included the former 
leader of the Independent State of Croatia, Ante Pavelić. His concealment af-
ter his flight from Croatia and his later departure to Argentina have been the 
subject of many memoirs, popular histories and historiographic texts. Many of 
them suggest that the Catholic Church or Western intelligence agencies played 
a crucial role in rescuing Pavelić. This author has concluded that most of these 
texts are politically motivated, while the original sources indicate that not one 
of these theories can be proven. Moreover, it would appear that the most likely 
hypothesis is that Pavelić, with his wealth of conspiratorial experience gained 
during his first interwar exile in Italy, adroitly exploited the existing chaos after 
the close of the war and managed to hide in Austria without any significant 
assistance from either the Catholic Church or Western intelligence agencies.
100  NARA, RG 319, Entry 134 B, box 173, Pro-memoria, 10 May 1946. Giovanni Battista Mon-
tini was at the time a cardinal and high official of the Secretariat of State, and he later became 
Pope Paul VI.
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Über verstecken von Ante Pavelić in Österreich 1945-1946 
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Artikel analysiert der Autor auf Grund von zugänglichen ameri-
kanischen und britischen Dokumenten sowie dem bis jetzt nicht genützten 
Nachlass des Führers des Unabhängigen Staates Kroatien (Nezavisna Država 
Hrvatska, NDH) Ante Pavelić sein Verstecken in Österreich, beziehungsweise 
eventuelle Rolle der westlichen Geheimdienste dabei. Sein Verstecken nach 
der Flucht aus Kroatien und seine spätere Abreise nach Argentinien wurden in 
mehreren Memoiren, populär-geschichtlichen und historiographischen Tex-
ten thematisiert.  In vielen von ihnen wird behauptet, dass die Katholische 
Kirche und die westlichen Geheimdienste entscheidende Rolle beim Versteck-
en von Pavelić spielten. Der Verfasser stellte fest, dass diese Texte politisch 
motiviert sind und dass originelle Quellen diese Behauptung nicht bestätigen. 
Vielmehr wäre, nach Meinung des Autors, die wahrscheinlichste Hypothese, 
dass Pavelić seine reiche konspirative Erfahrung aus dem Exil in Italien in der 
Zwischenkriegszeit im Chaos nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges aus-
nützte und es ihm gelang, sich ohne irgendwelche bedeutende Hilfe von der 
Katholischen Kirche und von westlichen Geheimdiensten in Österreich zu 
verstecken.
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